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ENFORCEMENT OF THE FCPA
BY THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Richard Shine*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Let me begin by following up on some of the comments regarding the antibribery provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCP A). 1 However, let me first point out that, as to the
record-keeping provisions 2 of the Act, the Justice Department has
pretty much deferred to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) because the SEC has the accountants on its staff. Enforcement of the record-keeping provisions 3 has been pretty much the
burden of the SEC, and the Justice Department has focused its attention and efforts on the antibribery provisions 4 which, in some
ways, we are in a better position to deal with, particularly if one
looks at it as a straight corruption statute. The SEC and the
Justice Department are staffed quite differently, the latter being
better staffed to enforce an anticorruption statute.
On the antibribery provisions, I think it might be useful for
me to point out that when you look at sections 103 and 104, 5 the
two antibribery provisions, it is clear that the gravamen of the offense is the corrupt use of an interstate facility for all of the prohibited purposes which would include, with some modifications
and some limitations, those prohibited purposes which are traditionally associated with bribery. Now, what does that mean? The
legislative history makes it clear that you do not have to have a
completed offense in order to violate the antibribery provisions of
the Act. 6 What that means, as a practical matter, is that when the
chairman of the board of a major Los Angeles multinational cor* Chief, Multinational Fraud Branch, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice
at the time of this lecture. Presently in private practice, Washington, D.C.
1. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, §§ 102-104, 91 Stat.
1494 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (Supp. V 1981)), reprinted in Appendix I, infra [hereinafter referred to as "the Act" or the "FCPA"].
2. Id., 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
3. Id.
4. Id. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2.
5. Codified at id.
6. See H.R. REP. No. 831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4121.
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poration, sitting in his office in Los Angeles, picks up the
telephone and calls the prime minister of an Asian country on the
phone and says to him, "You're about to decide whether your
country is going to buy 200 of my flying widgets; if you make sure
that your government purchases our widgets we'll deposit two
million dollars into your Swiss bank account;" at that point, there
has been a completed violation of the antibribery provisions of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. All of the elements of the offense
could be established if the government were able to prove the fact
of that conversation. That is true even if the Asian prime minister
said, "That's an outrageous suggestion, and I reject your offer; if
you come to my country, I'm going to have you arrested for attempted bribery." There would still have been a completed offense with the making of that single phone call.
That is not terribly different from federal domestic bribery
law. If that same chairman of the board walked into the office of
an elected federal official, a federal legislator for example, made
that same offer, and got that same response from that official, he
would have violated federal bribery law. 7 He made an offer, a corrupt offer, as the term "corrupt" is used in federal bribery law. Of
course, the thing that is a significant departure in the Act is the
nature of the offense: there must be some use of an interstate
facility, such as the telephone or a flight on a commercial airline,
internationally or within the United States. For example, in one of
our prosecutions, an airport facility in Florida, from which a
private airplane took off en route to Qatar, was the basis for the
charge; the airport itself was considered an interstate facility. 8
Let me make some additional observations about a few of the
Act's provisions which are of particular interest.
II.

FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES

First, let me discuss foreign subsidiaries in connection with
the Act. Initially, the term "domestic concern" was defined, in the
House of Representatives version of the bill, to include foreign
subsidiaries. In the Conference Committee, foreign subsidiaries
were excluded from the definition of domestic concern. As a consequence, the term "domestic concern," and therefore the coverage
of section 104 of the Act, 9 is limited to corporations, business
7. 18 u.s.c. § 201 (1980).
8. United States v. Carver, Civ. No. 79-1768 (S.D. Fla., filed April 9, 1979).
9. Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d)(B) (Supp. V 1981).
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trusts, and any other kinds of business entities which are organized
under the laws of a State, and to foreign corporations which have
their principal place of business in the United States.
In addition, "domestic concern" is also defined to include all
United States citizens. 10 Now the significance of that inclusion in
the Act, in terms of its relationship to foreign subsidiaries, is that,
although a foreign subsidiary cannot be charged as a principal violator of the Act, an American citizen who is an employee of that
foreign subsidiary can be charged as a principal violator, i.e., a
"domestic concern." An example of the use of that theory occurred
in the civil injunctive action which was brought in the Carver
case. 11 Carver and his partner had set up a Cayman Islands corporation. We reached that conduct by charging Carver and his partner,
because they were United States citizens, as domestic concerns
under the statute, even though they were theoretically operating
through a foreign corporation, i.e., their Cayman Islands corporation.
I should also add that a foreign subsidiary, or a foreign corporation, whether it's a subsidiary or not, could also be charged
under this Act, as in any other criminal statute in the federal
criminal code, if that foreign corporation is an aider or abettor to a
principal violator of the statute. 12 Such a foreign corporation could
also be charged as a co-conspirator under 18 U .S.C. § 371.

III.

THE "CORRUPTLY" STAND ARD

Now, on the issue of "corruptly," there is a great deal of concern about the meaning of that term. Let me supplement some of
the things that Frederick Wade said about the word "corruptly"
by indicating to you the best guide as to the meaning of that term.
I am focusing on the language in the legislative history which refers to "evil motive or purpose." That language is similar to what
is contained in the Devitt and Blackmar standard federal jury instruction on the meaning of the word corruptly. 13 I am not sure
10. Id. at § 78dd-2(d)(A).
11. See supra, note 8.
12. Title 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1980) provides:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels,
commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him
or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.
13. DEVITT & BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 34.08 (3d ed.
1977) contains the following language:

Published by SURFACE, 1982

3

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 9, No. 2 [1982], Art. 6

286

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 9:283

that that language, although it is the way juries are instructed in
federal criminal trials, is terribly enlightening in terms of the
meaning of "corruptly." The most significant part of the legislative history, as to the meaning of the word "corruptly," appears
in the House Report. 14 Let me just read a sentence or two. In the
House Report, it says, in part,
The word "corruptly" connotes an evil motive or purpose such as
that required under 18 U.S.C. § 201(b), which prohibits domestic
bribery. As in 18 U .S.C. § 201(b), the word "corruptly" indicates
an intent or desire wrongfully to influence the recipient. It does
not require the act to be fully consummated, or succeed in producing the desired outcome. 15

The significance of that legislative history is that one can
then argue that the meaning of the word "corruptly" in the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act can be divined from looking at the
cases that construe the term "corruptly" in 18 U .S.C. § 201. I would
suggest to you that a good starting place in that journey would be
United States v. Brewster. 16 Without getting into the details of
the Brewster case, Brewster had been charged with a violation of
both the bribery subsection and the gratuities subsection of the
statute. A bribe is covered by 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) and is a fifteenyear felony. An illegal gratuity is covered by 18 U.S.C. § 201(g)
and is a lesser felony. Brewster was acquitted of the major
bribery charge, but convicted of taking an illegal gratuity. The
issue in the Brewster case for the Court of Appeals was to define
the difference between an illegal gratuity and a bribe under 18
U.S.C. § 201. I will read to you what you might consider to be one
of the more significant parts of the Brewster case, in terms of providing guidance as to the meaning of "corruptly." The Court said:

An act is "corruptly" done, if done voluntarily and intentionally, and with the
bad purpose of accomplishing either an unlawful end or result, or a lawful end or
result by some unlawful method or means.
So, a person acts "corruptly" whenever he makes a willful attempt to persuade or influence the official action of a public official, by an offer of money or
anything of value.
The motive to act "corruptly" is ordinarily a hope or expectation of either
financial gain or other benefit to one's self, or some aid or profit or benefit to
another.
14. H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977).
15. Id. at 8.
16. 506 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol9/iss2/6

4

Shine: Enforcement

1982]

Enforcement

287

The bribery section [that is, 201(c)] makes necessary an explicit
quid pro quo, which need not exist if only an illegal gratuity is involved. The bribe is the mover or producer of the official act, but
the official act for which the gratuity is given might have been
done without the gratuity, although the gratuity was produced
because of the official act. 11

I would suggest that one can construe the term "corrupt" in
the FCP A, consistent with the Brewster decision, to mean, as a
kind of rule of thumb, that there must be a quid pro quo: "I'll pay
you in return for your doing this official act to benefit me."

A.

Extortion

The issue of the meaning of "corrupt" raises a series of other
related issues under the Act which have been of significant concern to people. First, what about the issue of extortion? What
about the situation where a company operating in a foreign country is told, "You must pay me this or you will not get the
contract." Or a foreign official says, "You must pay me this or we
will expropriate your business." Or, "You must pay me this or we
will," (to use the language from the legislative history) "dynamite
your oil rig."
Now that raises a whole series of interesting and sometimes
difficult questions as to the extent to which extortion is a defense
under the Act. I would suggest to you that, here again, the meaning of the term corrupt as used in 18 U.S.C. § 201 is helpful. On the
issue of extortion, the legislative history 18 reads as follows: "Section 103 and 104 cover payments and gifts intended to influence
the recipient regardless of who first suggested the payment or
gift." 19
Let me pause here to interject that that sentence is designed
to make clear that the common law distinction between extortion
and bribery is eliminated under this Act. As some of you may
know, at common law, the distinction between extortion and
bribery turned on who first proposed the payment. If the government official first proposed the payment, then it was extortion. If
the citizen first proposed the payment, it was bribery. Well, of

17. Id. at 82 (bracket added).
18. S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS
4098.
19. Id. at 10.
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course that resulted in some difficult choices for the government,
depending on what the proof was. If you charged extortion and the
proof showed bribery, or charged bribery and the defense can
establish extortion in that the foreign official first broached the offer, then the defendant is acquitted. What is clear from this
legislative history is that the common law distinction is
eliminated. It is irrelevant who first proposed the payment.
Going back to the legislative history, it states: "The defense
that the payment was demanded on the part of the government official as a price for gaining entry into a market or to obtain a contract would not suffice since at some point the U.S. company
would make a conscious decision whether or not to pay a bribe." 20
Let me interject here that that legislative history means that
if the payment is to obtain business, that is, to get into the market
in the first place, such a payment is corrupt and therefore illegal,
and not a lawful payment made in response to an extortion demand by the foreign official. The reason being that the company
has the choice of not going into the market at all. Its will is not being overborne. The company has freedom of choice. The legislative
history goes on to say:
That the payment may have been at first proposed by the recipient rather than the U.S. Company does not alter the corrupt
purpose on the part of the person paying the bribe. On the other
hand, true extortion situations would not be covered by this provision since a payment to an official to keep an oil rig from being
dynamited should not be held to be made with the requisite corrupt purpose. 21

I would suggest to you that this language from the legislative
history is consistent with the definition of the term "corruptly" as
it is used in federal domestic bribery law. Extortion in federal
domestic bribery law, it is clear, is not a complete defense to a
charge of bribery. Evidence of extortion is, however, admissible at
the trial in that it is relevant to the issue of whether or not the
defendant had a corrupt intent at the time he made the payment.
U.S. v. Barash 22 deals with the relationship between extortion and
the issue of corrupt intent. Basically, the courts have found that
such evidence is admissible and is to be considered by the jury in
20. Id.
21. Id. at 10-11.
22. 365 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1966).
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making its finding of fact as to whether there was a corrupt intent.
United States v. Kahn 23 deals with this same issue. Let me
quote an interpretation of Barash from the Kahn case.
Finally, as a policy matter, we think that the Barash rule is the
preferable one. Almost every bribery case involves at least some
coercion by the public official. The instances of honest men being
corrupted by "dirty money," if not non-existent, are at least exceedingly rare. The proper response to coercion by corrupt
public officials should be to go to the authorities, not to make the
payoff. Thus, unless the extortion is so overpowering as to
negate criminal intent or willfulness we would be loath to allow
those who give in to illegal coercion to claim it as a total defense
to bribery charges. 24

I would suggest that it would be very difficult to establish that
one did not have a corrupt intent on the basis that the payment
was extorted. The evidence of extortion must be strong enough,
as the Kahn court indicated, to negate criminal intent.
Evidence of economic extortion, as contrasted to threats of
violence to persons or to property which is referred to in the
legislative history, is also admissible on the issue of corrupt intent. This notion is supported by the federal domestic bribery
cases.

IV.

ENFORCEMENT POLICIES OF THE
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT

Let me move on to discuss some of the enforcement policies
the Department of Justice has adopted relating to the Act. These
policies apply both to criminal enforcement actions and civil enforcement actions, since Justice has civil injunctive authority for
domestic concerns.
You might be interested to know that, because of the obvious
sensitivity both from a national security point of view and a
foreign policy point of view, the Department has administered the
enforcement of this statute quite differently than the enforcement
of most of the provisions of Title 18 of the United States Code. Administration of the enforcement effort has been highly centralized.
Generally, FCPA cases, by the terms of the United States Attorney's Manual, are not investigated and prosecuted by the
23. 472 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1973).
24. Id. at 278.

Published by SURFACE, 1982

7

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 9, No. 2 [1982], Art. 6

290

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 9:283

ninety-four United States Attorney's Offices around the country.
They are primarily investigated and prosecuted by the Multinational Fraud Branch in the Criminal Division at the Justice Department. Among other reasons, that is being done to make sure
that there is a nationally uniform enforcement policy. Moreover,
virtually any step that is taken in the investigative process, even
more than in the post-indictment process, has potentially significant foreign policy and national security implications.
At the current time we have about sixty cases under investigation. Thus far, we have closed without prosecution perhaps
another thirty cases. Justice has had only two cases in which
public charges have been brought under the antibribery provisions of the FCP A: one was a civil injunctive action, United States
v. Carver 25 filed in the Southern District of Florida; and the other,
United States v. Kenny International Corp. 26 filed in the District
of Columbia.
One of the reasons for the limited number of prosecutions
under the Act is that much of our time, until quite recently, has
been spent in the investigation and prosecution of what has been
commonly referred to as the pre-Act or pre-Foreign Corrupt Practices Act overseas payment cases. There were a long series of prosecutions of companies in connection with those overseas payment
cases in which the conduct pre-dated the existence of the FCP A. 27
25. Supra note 8.
26. Crim. No. 79-372 (D.D.C., filed Aug. 2, 1979) and United States v. Kenny International Corp., Civ. No. 79-2038 (D.D.C., filed Aug. 2, 1979).
Since this lecture was given, the Justice Department has initiated some additional
FCPA prosecutions: United States v. C.E. Miller Corporation, Crim . No. 82-788 (C.D. Cal.,
filed Sept. 17, 1982); United States v. Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc., Crim. No. H-82-207 (S.D.
Tex., filed Sept. 22, 1982); United States v. Crawford Enterprises, Inc., Crim. No. H-82-224
(S.D. Tex., filed Oct. 22, 1982); United States v. International Harvester Co., Crim. No.
H-82-244 (S.D. Tex., filed Nov. 18, 1982); United States v. Applied Process Products
Overseas, Inc., Crim. No. 83-004 (D.D.C., filed Jan. 5, 1983); United States v. Gary D.
Bateman, Civ. No. 83-014 (D.D.C., filed Jan. 5, 1983); and a related case, United States v.
Gary D. Bateman, Crim. No. 83-005 (D.D.C., filed Jan. 5, 1983).
27. See United States v. The Williams Companies, Crim. No. 78-144 (D.D.C., filed
March 24, 1978); United States v. Control Data Corp., Crim. No. 78-210 (D.D.C., filed April
26, 1978); United States v. United Brands Co., Crim. No. 78-538 (S.D.N.Y., filed July 19,
1978); United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., Crim. No . 78-566 (D.D.C., filed Nov. 20,
1978); United States v. Gulfstream American Corp., Crim. No. 79-7 (D.D.C., filed Jan. 3,
1979); United States v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., Crim. No. 79-270 (D.D.C., filed June 1,
1979); United States v. Page Airways, Inc., Crim. No. 79-273 (D.D.C., filed June 4, 1979);
United States v. Textron, Inc., Crim. No. 79-330 (D.D.C., filed July 10, 1979); United States
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., Crim. No. 79-516 (D.D.C., filed Nov. 9, 1979); United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., Crim. No. 80-431 (S.D.N.Y., filed July 24, 1980); United States v. The
Boeing Co., Crim. No. 82-199 (D.D.C., filed July 30, 1982).
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A variety of criminal statutes were utilized, including the Currency
and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, 28 the false statements
statutes 29 and, to a lesser extent, the mail and wire fraud
statutes. 30 Much of the Department's time until now has been devoted to finishing those cases, many of which were enormously
complex. The Department is now completing the final phases of
that pre-Act enforcement effort and has begun to focus more attention on post-FCP A investigations and prosecutions.

V.

INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES

At this point I would like to discuss some of the unique investigative approaches which are being utilized by the Justice Department because of the unique nature of the Act, particularly in
terms of its foreign policy implications. Initially, as a general rule,
what we try to do in these cases is to focus our investigative effort
in the United States, without informing the foreign government in
question of the fact that we are investigating. But I should add
that there are obviously some exceptions to that general rule. The
primary reason we generally do not notify the foreign government
at the beginning of an investigation is that, as you can well imagine, it is relatively easy for confidence men, whether they be
company employees or independent agents, to claim that they
need an extra million dollars added to the commission fee because
they must pass the extra money to the prime minister of the country
involved in order to obtain the contract. In fact, these employees or
agents never talked to the prime minister and have no intention of
bribing him. It is merely a fraud or a device to increase their own
fee. They deposit the extra million dollars into their own or a confederate's Swiss bank account.
When an informant or an insider tells us that there is a bribe
in process or that a bribe of a foreign government official has
already occurred, we do not immediately notify the foreign
government. As you can well imagine, if we started to communicate to a foreign government every unsupported and uncorroborated allegation of bribery of its officials, there would be
worldwide foreign relations turmoil, given the ease with which
such allegations can be made by persons with ulterior motives.
This point is best evidenced by the fact that we have closed a
significant number of cases without any prosecution.
28. 31 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq.
29. 18 u.s.c. § 1001.
30. Id. at §§ 1341, 1343.
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We have avoided this problem by focusing our investigation
within the United States and closely controlling dissemination of
the allegation and any information developed. We have sought
evidence initially from witnesses in the United States, corporate
records maintained within the United States, and bank records
and whatever other sources we might have available in the United
States. Only after we have concluded, as a result of our initial investigation, that indeed there is significant reason to believe a
bribe was paid or offered to a foreign government official, do we
notify the foreign government.

A.

Notification of foreign governments and disclosure of the
identity of foreign officials in indictments and complaints

In order to deal with the problems of international investigation and with the foreign policy consequences of much of what we
do, we have established an informal procedure with our colleagues
at the State Department. The procedure is two-fold. First, we do
not tell our colleagues at the State Department anything at all
about our investigations as they are proceeding. We do not pass
information to the State Department about the substance of what
we are investigating or what we are developing. Consequently,
the State Department can not pass along information on the investigation to the United States Ambassador in the country in
question. That is a long-standing policy, agreed upon by us and our
colleagues at State. It is designed primarily to avoid politicization
of these investigations in a way that could prove embarrassing to
the United States.
Many ambassadors are not happy with this policy, as you can
well imagine. However, if for example, the United States Ambassador were told that the Justice Department had received
allegations that a bribe had been paid to Minister X, and Minister
X, having learned of the investigation, questions the Ambassador
about the investigation at a cocktail party, the Ambassador is then
in a rather untenable position. Either he discloses to Minister X
what he knows about the investigation or he dissembles. Even if
he dissembles, the Ambassador may inadvertently and unknowingly disclose something to Minister X that would compromise the
investigation. Therefore, both State and Justice have agreed that
both agencies are better off if the Ambassador does not know
about Department of Justice investigations. This is particularly
true since, as I have already indicated, many of these investiga-
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tions are closed without prosecutions. It would cause unnecessary
complications to American foreign relations if the State Department were to know ahout every allegation and the details of our
investigations.
However, the second part of this procedure is an arrangement for notification of the State Department when we reasonably
anticipate something happening in the investigation which will
make public the fact of the investigation or the allegation. If we
are about to file a criminal charge or a civil complaint which names
the foreign official or foreign country, we will first notify the State
Department so that it can notify the United States Embassy,
which will pass the appropriate diplomatic note to the foreign
government. Therefore, the foreign government will first learn
about the investigation through formal diplomatic channels and
not through the newspaper. Then the foreign government is not
caught by surprise, which is of crucial importance in maintaining
stable diplomatic relations. Moreover, if for example, and this has
already happened in some instances, during a grand jury investigation a witness refuses to answer questions, we may have to
ask the court to hold the witness in civil contempt. If we ask the
court to incarcerate the witness until the witness answers the
questions, that will be part of a public proceeding in which some of
the allegations may be disclosed. When we anticipate that might
happen, we also notify the State Department so that it can formally notify the foreign government.
In regard to notification of the foreign government, let me
mention something of interest to the many private practitioners
around the country who may become involved in our cases. In our
public pleadings, whether we are bringing an indictment or filing
a civil complaint, generally we will not agree to withhold the identity of the foreign country or of the foreign official. Our current
policy evolved out of our experience in the Westinghouse 31 pre-Act
prosecution. Let me first indicate what happened in that case.
Then I will explain our current policy.
In the Westinghouse case, which involved bribes to an individual who was, at the time of the prosecution, the Deputy
Prime Minister of Egypt, we initially agreed with the company to
with old the identity of the foreign official and the country. We
reached this agreement because, at the time of the plea, the late
31. See supra note 27.

Published by SURFACE, 1982

11

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 9, No. 2 [1982], Art. 6

294

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 9:283

President Sadat was in the United States negotiating a peace settlement in the Middle East. For a variety of reasons, the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia rejected the plea
bargain. The Court objected, among other things, to the fact that,
by the terms of the plea agreement, the name of the country and
of the foreign official would not be disclosed in public. The day
after the plea agreement was rejected, sources outside the Justice
Department leaked to the press the identity of the country and of
the official. Therefore, when we went back into court everything
was disclosed in the pleadings. To our great relief, the disclosure
had .no impact whatsoever on our foreign relations with any nation, including Egypt. Moreover, the Egyptian government stripped the Deputy Prime Minister of his parliamentary immunity and
prosecuted him in Egypt for bribery. Indeed, the Egyptian
government, as have the governments of a number of other countries in which there have been allegations of widespread corruption, has now launched a major anticorruption campaign.
As a result of our experience in the Westinghouse case, we
adopted a more refined policy dealing with the disclosure vel non
of the identity of the country or of the foreign official as part of
plea agreements in FCP A cases. This policy applies only in the
plea bargain situation since, obviously, if an indictment is to be
litigated we have to allege all of the details of the transaction
which we would have to prove at trial. In the plea bargain situation, we will agree not to disclose the identity of the country or of
the foreign official only if there is a satisfactory law enforcement
or foreign policy basis to do so. The law enforcement basis is
limited to those situations where there would be significant risk of
death or great bodily injury to persons if the identity of the country or of the official is disclosed. In that regard, our general position is that the presence of company employees in the foreign
country is not a sufficient basis for nondisclosure. We can control
the timing of any public disclosures. The company can avoid
danger to its employees by simply removing them from the country in advance of the public plea, particularly if the employees are
United States citizens. However, if we believe that there is an
unavoidable risk of death or great bodily injury to persons if full
disclosure is made, we will agree to withhold the identity of the
country or of the official. I should add, however, that such a situation has yet to arise.
The only other basis upon which we will agree to nonhttps://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol9/iss2/6
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disclosure is that of' foreign policy. However, the foreign policy
reasons for nondisclosure must be communicated to the Justice
Department in writing by the State Department. If we receive
such a communication, then we would certainly consider it in making the decision on whether to insist on full disclosure. I might add
that thus far we have never received such a written communication, although a number of people have asked the State Department to send us that kind of written request. The State Department has yet to find that any of our cases are of such a nature that
full disclosure would significantly damage United States foreign
policy interests.

B.

Notification of foreign governments and investigative
cooperation through the use of' executive
agreements on mutual assistance

There is one other major circumstance in which we will go to
the foreign government for reasons other than anticipated public
disclosures in the United States. When our investigation has advanced to the point where we are convinced that there was indeed
criminal activity, not only in the United States under the FCP A,
but criminal activity in the foreign country under its own domestic
bribery laws, and we have reason to believe that we may receive
investigative assistance from the foreign government because
that government is interested in enforcing its own domestic bribery laws, we may then make disclosures to the foreign government.
But we proceed in some very special ways. First, we will go to
the foreign government only on a prosecutor-to-prosecutor basis.
We never do any of these investigations through the use of Interpol, which in ordinary criminal cases conducts many transnational
criminal investigations. In the ordinary case, Interpol people in
the United States ask the local police in the foreign country to do
the investigation for them. Because of the nature of the allegations
we are investigating, using Interpol would be similar to asking the
local police in the United States to investigate an allegation that
the President took a bribe. It would be explosive in the foreign
country. It would be far beyond what one would reasonably expect
local law enforcement in that country to handle. As a consequence
we have never used Interpol to assist us in these investigations.
Secondly, when we have reached the conclusion that we may
be able to get assistance from the foreign government, we first
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seek an executive agreement on mutual assistance. The executive
agreement is an agreement between our Department of Justice
and the Ministry of Justice of the foreign government. They are
not government-to-government agreements. They are also limited
by their terms to particular investigations. We currently have in
force executive agreements on mutual assistance with the
ministries of justice of twenty-six foreign governments.
As background information, these agreements represent a
policy begun in 1976 by the Justice Department, with the concurrence of the SEC and the State Department. At that time the
overseas bribery scandals became public in the United States, the
first major one that resulted in an agreement being the scandal involving Lockheed. In 1976, after the public disclosures in the
United States involving Lockheed's activities in the Netherlands,
Japan and Italy, those governments, of course, asked us to disclose our evidence to them. At that time the Justice Department
adopted a policy which is still in effect today. We will not pass any
information to a foreign government relating to illicit payments in
that country unless that government first enters into an executive
agreement on mutual assistance with us. Such agreements were
entered into with Italy, 32 Japan, 33 and the Netherlands 34 in
mid-1976 in connection with the Lockheed matter. Since that time
we have negotiated agreements with the ministries of justice of an
additional twenty-three countries. A number of those agreements
have since been amended to include additional investigations.
Basically, the agreements do two things. First, each Department obligates itself to keep confidential and in law enforcement
channels any evidence or information received pursuant to the
agreement. Such information may be made public only in connection with administrative, civil or criminal judicial proceedings.
The agreements are designed to prevent the minister of justice
from receiving information from us and then releasing it at a press

32. Procedures for Mutual Assistance in the Administration of Justice in Connection
with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation Matter, March 29, 1976, United States-Italy, 27
U.S.T. 3437, T.I.A.S. No. 8374.
33. Procedures for Mutual Assistance in the Administration of Justice in Connection
with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation Matter, March 23, 1976, United States-Japan, 27
U.S.T. 946, T.I.A.S. No. 8233.
34. Procedures for Mutual Assistance in the Administration of Justice in Connection
with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation Matter, March 29, 1976, United States-Netherlands,
27 U.S.T. 1064, T.I.A.S. 8245.
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conference the next day. The information may only be used for
legitimate law enforcement purposes. This prevents, as would
otherwise happen in Japan for example, the disclosure of the information given to the foreign government to investigative committees of the legislature. The second significant purpose of the
agreements is that they obligate the ministries in both countries
to use their best efforts, within the confines of their domestic law,
to assist each other in the investigation, and any prosecutions
which may result from the investigations.
It should be noted that the agreements are limited to illicit
payment cases. Moreover, they are limited by their terms to particular investigations. Most of the agreements came into being
because, with all due respect to my colleagues from the SEC, the
SEC had a number of cases in which they filed civil injunctive actions naming countries and officials. That, of course, always caused
those countries to ask the Justice Department for information. In
response, the Justice Department said, with the concurrence of
the SEC, that unless there was an executive agreement, we would
not give the information to the foreign government. The bulk of
the agreements, therefore, were initially negotiated as a result of
prior public disclosures in the United States by the SEC.
We have now started, in the last year or so, to use the
agreements in a more aggressive way. Until that time the fact of
the investigation and the identity of the company was already a
matter of public record. Therefore, the agreement itself would
disclose the fact that it covered the investigation of the Boeing
Company or the McDonnell-Douglas Corporation. Lately, when we
are conducting a non-public investigation and we reach a point
where we feel it is appropriate to go to the foreign government,
we contact that government through diplomatic channels and seek
an amendment to the agreement. Rather than publicly identify in
the agreement the company which is under the investigation,
which for obvious reasons we do not want to do, we have started
to identify the investigations by means of Justice Department
numbers. In more recent agreements, therefore, instead of a company name you will find a Justice Department investigation
number such as MA101. The significant thing is that in some instances we are notifying the foreign government in advance, obtaining its commitment to help us, and assisting that government
to enforce its own bribery laws simultaneously with the enforcement of the FCP A.
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Bilateral Mutual Assistance Treaties

Permit me to draw a distinction between these executive
agreements on mutual assistance which thus far, as I said, have
been limited to illicit payment cases, and another federal initiative
in the field of bilateral mutual assistance treaties. Since 1979 when
the Office of International Affairs (OIA) in the Criminal Division
was created, there has been a continuous effort to negotiate
bilateral mutual assistance treaties. The first and earliest such
treaty was negotiated with the Swiss in 1977 before OIA was
created. The Swiss Treaty 35 is limited to providing assistance in
criminal matters.
These are broad-based treaties in that they apply to all
criminal matters, not just illicit payment cases. The Swiss treaty
is a fairly long, complex document. Some have suggested that it is
too long and too complex. In any case, the treaties are primarily
designed to make more efficient the international evidence gathering process by eliminating the need for letters rogatory. The tradi·
tional means of obtaining evidence has been through letters
rogatory. The letters are issued by a court in the United States,
and are addressed to a court in the foreign jurisdiction seeking
that court's assistance. The letters are sent to the State Department, which sends them through diplomatic channels to the
United States Embassy in the foreign country. The Embassy then
transmits the documents to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of that
country, which transmits them to the foreign Attorney General or
to the foreign court directly. It is an extraordinarily inefficient
process sometimes ta~ing eight months or a year.
In lieu of the letters rogatory process, the Mutual Assistance
Treaties provide for a "Competent Authority" to be appointed in
each country, usually the Ministry of Justice in each country. The
two competent authorities then make direct prosecutor-toprosecutor requests of each other, avoiding the diplomatic channel. These written requests do not involve the courts, which must
sign letters rogatory requests. These treaties, depending upon the
country involved, can by their terms modify domestic law. In the
United States, since treaty law is supreme, the treaties do modify
our domestic law.

35. Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, January 23, 1977, United States-Switzerland, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302.
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As a result of, for example, the 1977 Swiss treaty, we may
now obtain Swiss bank records for use in criminal prosecutions,
notwithstanding prior provisions to the contrary in Swiss bank
secrecy laws. Since the OJA was created, there has been a concerted effort to negotiate similar treaties with other countries.
There has been a similar treaty negotiated with Turkey which has
been ratified both by the Senate and by the Turkish government
and is now in effect. 36 Treaties have been negotiated with the
Netherlands and Colombia, which have been ratified by the
Senate but are still awaiting ratification by the two treaty partners. Treaties now are being negotiated with Germany, Italy, and
several other countries. 37
I should add that in all of these negotiations, we initially try
to have the treaty cover not only criminal matters, but civil and
administrative matters as well. The Dutch, I believe, have agreed
to a treaty which covers not only criminal, but civil and administrative matters. Of course, the Swiss treaty, even with the
recent interest of the SEC, is limited to criminal matters.

VI.

FCPA REVIEW PROCEDURE

In conclusion, I would be remiss if I did not briefly describe
the procedure the Justice Department has established to provide
guidance to the business community on the FCP A. In 1980 we
established the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review
Procedure. 38 Basically the Procedure is modelled after the Antitrust Division's Business Review Procedure. It permits a company to submit to us a Review Request, in writing, describing a
proposed transaction. We will then indicate whether or not we will
take an enforcement action, if the transaction proceeds. Thus far,
there have been ten Review Releases under the Review Procedure.
In establishing the Procedure, we have maximized the protection from public disclosure that we provide to confidential
business information. The first four releases, issued in 1980, dealt
with a variety of issues, some of which are addressed in S.708, a
36. Treaty on Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Jan. l, 1981,
United States-Turkey,_ U.S.T. _ , T.I.A.S. No. 9891.
37. In November 1982 the United States signed a Mutual Assistance Treaty with Italy
which, like the Treaties with the Netherlands and Colombia, is now pending final ratification before it goes into effect.
38. 28 C.F.R. § 50.18.

Published by SURFACE, 1982

17

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 9, No. 2 [1982], Art. 6

300

Syr. J. Int') L. & Com.

[Vol. 9:283

bill to amend the FCPA. 39 Release Number 80-4, involving
Lockheed and Sulyman Olayan in Saudi Arabia, is of particular interest.40 It sets out a fact pattern outlining a situation where,
under certain very limited circumstances, a company may enter
into a business relationship with someone who is also a foreign
government official. The Release does not, by any means, support
the notion that a company can hire as an agent a full-time official
of a foreign government, particularly when that official is going to
decide whether or not the company will get a contract. It is a much
more narrow Release in that Olayan was, if you will, similar to a
very part-time, outside director in his capacity as a government official.
We issued, in 1981, two more Releases. The one which may be
of particular interest involves Bechtel. The issue of "reason to
know" under the FCP A and the precautionary steps that were
taken by Bechtel to avoid a "reason to know" problem were dealt
with the Release Number 81-2. Under the circumstances, we indicated we would not take an enforcement action.
Finally, there have been four Releases issued in 1982. Release
Number 82-1 deals with another important current issue under the
Act. It involves the payment of a finder's fee to an agent which is
not necessarily related to services performed by the agent. Release
Number 82-2 involves a Request by the State of Missouri relating to
promotional expenses. The State, in combination with some private
business interests, wanted to bring to Missouri foreign government
officials in connection with promotional activities. The State
wanted to pay for the travel and entertainment expenses of the
officials. Such promotional expenses are also addressed in S.708.
The Releases all indicate that our decision is not binding on
anyone other than the parties submitting the Review Request.
However, the Releases are issued to provide some guidance to the
private practitioner and to the business community. The most
significant thing, from the corporation's point of view, about the
availability of the Review Procedure is that, even in situations
where they may be a "technical violation" of the FCP A, the company can obtain from us in advance a binding exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
39. S. 708 was passed by the Senate on November 23, 1981 during the ninety-seventh
Congress. S. 708, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 13,983-85 (1981). No action was taken
by the House on S. 708 during that Congress.
40. The Review Releases have not been published but are available upon request from
the Department's Public Information Office.
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